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The Economic Potential of Second-Generation Biofuels: Implications for Social 
Welfare, Land Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Illinois 
Xiaoguang Chen, Madhu Khanna and Hayri Önal
1 
Abstract:  This  paper  develops  a  dynamic  micro-economic  land  use  model  that 
maximizes social welfare and internalizes externality from greenhouse gas emissions to 
obtain the optimal land use allocation for traditional row crops and bioenergy crops (corn 
stover, miscanthus and switchgrass), the mix of cellulosic feedstocks and fuel and food 
prices. We use this carbon tax policy as a benchmark to compare the implications of 
existing biofuel policies on land use, social welfare and the environment for the 2007-
2022 period. The model is operationalized using  yields of perennial  grasses obtained 
from  a  biophysical  model,  county  level  data  on  yields  of  traditional  row  crops  and 
production costs for row crops and bioenergy crops in Illinois. We show that a carbon tax 
policy that is directly related to carbon intensity of fuels can generate the highest social 
welfare  among  alternative  policy  scenarios.  The  existing  ethanol  tax  credits  result  in 
substantial deadweight losses and higher GHG emissions as compared to the baseline. 
Ethanol blending mandates with subsidies lead to further welfare losses and higher GHG 
emissions. To meet advanced biofuel blending mandates, corn stover and miscanthus are 
used but the mix of viable cellulosic feedstocks varies spatially and temporally. Corn 
stover  is  viable  mainly  in  central  and  northern  Illinois  while  miscanthus  acres  are 
primarily concentrated on southern Illinois. The blending mandates lead to a significant 
shift in acreage from soybeans and pasture to corn and a change in crop rotation and 
tillage practices. 
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Introduction 
Biofuels are being increasingly viewed as a strategy to reduce reliance on foreign 
oil, to stabilize energy prices, mitigate global climate change and stimulate rural 
economic development in the U.S. Early energy policy in the U.S. sought to promote 
production and use of the first-generation biofuels, such as corn ethanol, through tax 
credits and import tariff. However, growing realization of the land competition created by 
corn-based biofuels and the implications of diverting corn for ethanol production on food 
prices has led to greater attention to second-generation biofuels from cellulosic 
feedstocks.  Cellulosic ethanol also has much greater potential to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions than corn-based ethanol. The recently enacted Energy Independence 
and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) places mandates that 21 billion gallons of ethanol be 
produced from cellulosic feedstocks such as crop residues and perennial grasses (such as 
switchgrass and miscanthus) that have the potential to reduce GHG emissions by over 
50%. In addition, the recent Farm Bill of 2008 provides considerable subsidies and 
incentives for cellulosic feedstocks. 
From the perspective of social efficiency, government intervention in domestic 
markets is justified if it can reduce market failures caused by externalities. Government 
policies that seek to reduce GHG emissions should correct market prices to reflect their 
carbon intensity. Existing policy incentives such as biofuel tax credits and mandates are, 
however, not related to the carbon intensity of fuels and their welfare implications are not 
clear. This paper evaluates the competitiveness of biofuels from alternative feedstocks, 
their land use and GHG mitigation benefits in the absence of any government   4 
intervention. We then examine the effects of biofuel subsidies and mandates on social 
welfare, land use, GHG emissions and nitrogen use.  
We develop a dynamic spatial optimization model that determines the optimal 
land use choices to maximize social welfare that is the sum of consumers’ and producers’ 
surplus in fuel and food markets, subject to demand-supply balances, resource 
availability constraints, and technical constraints underlying production possibilities. 
Consumers obtain utility from vehicle miles traveled (VMT) that are produced by 
blending gasoline, corn ethanol and cellulosic ethanol. Gasoline and ethanol are 
imperfect substitutes in the production of VMT while corn ethanol and cellulosic ethanol 
are perfect substitutes. The model incorporates food and feed demand curves to obtain 
market equilibrium prices as endogenous variables. Spatial heterogeneity in yields, 
production costs for crops and land availability within a region are used to examine the 
heterogeneity in the viability of biofuels from alternative feedstocks across geographical 
locations and the optimal mix of feedstocks. Lifecycle analysis is used to estimate the 
externality costs of GHG emissions that are directly related to the type of fuel consumed 
and crops produced.  
We use this framework to first analyze the first-best policies needed to correct the 
externality caused by VMT and crop production. Second, we compare the social welfare 
and environmental implications of alternative second-best policies, such as ethanol tax 
credits. Third, we explore the effects of binding biofuel mandates with ethanol and 
bioenergy feedstock subsidies. The model uses county-specific data for Illinois that is a 
major region for corn and soybean production in the U.S. to examine the economic and 
environmental implications of biofuel policies over the period of 2007-2022. Illinois has   5 
the climatic and soil conditions that are suitable for perennials that can be used as 
feedstocks for cellulosic biofuels. Estimates of nitrogen use and life-cycle GHG 
emissions associated with biofuels from different feedstocks are based on county-specific 
production practices in the U.S. 
 
Related Literature 
  Previous studies have examined impacts of existing domestic biofuel policies. 
Gallagher et al. (2003) analyze the implications of a renewable fuel mandate of 5 billion 
gallons of ethanol as a fuel additive with a conjunction of national MTBE ban on fuel 
prices and consumption, social welfare and the environment. They find that it decreases 
air pollution but raises the cost of the blended fuel considerably relative to baseline levels. 
This decreases gasoline consumption by 4% and social welfare (without considering 
environmental benefits) by 6% while raising corn price by 3%. Gardner (2007) compares 
the deadweight losses of an ethanol subsidy as compared to a deficiency payment policy 
that directly subsidizes corn. He estimates deadweight losses due to the ethanol subsidy 
to be 4 times in short run and 17 times in long run greater than those if a deficiency 
payment policy had been implemented instead. Environmental benefits of the ethanol 
subsidy would need to be valued at least at 23 cents per gallon of ethanol to offset the 
deadweight losses of the subsidy.  
de Gorter and Just (2009) analyze the effects of a biofuel tax credit in the 
presence of a blend mandate while assuming that ethanol and gasoline are perfect 
substitutes. They show in the presence of the blend mandate a tax credit acts as a fuel 
consumption subsidy to increase gasoline consumption by 0.4% and corn price by 0.3%.   6 
de Gorter and Just (2008) extend this work by incorporating an import tariff and find in 
the presence of a tax credit and an import tariff a binding ethanol mandate leads to an 
increase in domestic ethanol price by 6.6% in 2015. It also increases corn price by 13.4%. 
  Only a few studies examine the environmental impacts of existing and alternative 
biofuel policies. Vedenov and Wetzstein (2008) incorporate the environmental and fuel 
security externalities to show the optimal subsidy for ethanol should be $0.22 per gallon 
since it improves fuel security valued at $0.17 per gallon. Khanna, Ando and Taheripour 
(2008)  examine  the  welfare  effects  of  an  ethanol  subsidy  while  considering  carbon 
emissions and congestion externalities caused by VMT. This framework is extended by 
Ando, Khanna and Taheripour (2009) and by Lasco and Khanna (2009) to examine the 
effects of a blend mandate and an import tariff with an ethanol subsidy, respectively.   
These papers show that existing biofuel policies are associated with large losses in social 
welfare relative to the optimal and with higher GHG emissions. 
There are several studies that have examined the dynamics of agricultural land 
allocation between traditional row crops and bioenergy crops. Foremost among these are 
the studies based on the Forest and Agricultural Sector Optimization Model (FASOM) 
which  is  a  multi-period,  price  endogenous,  spatial  market  equilibrium  land  allocation 
model.  Alig  et  al.  (1997)  and  Alig  et  al.  (2000)  apply  this  model  to  investigate  the 
implications of achieving given carbon sequestration targets and producing woody crops 
for the U.S. pulp and paper sector, respectively. McCarl et al. (2000) apply FASOM to 
examine the competitiveness of electric power generation using bioenergy from forest 
products  and  switchgrass  instead  of  coal  while  disaggregating  the  U.S.  into  11 
homogenous  regions.  McCarl  and  Schneider  (2001)  expand  this  model  into  the   7 
ASMGHG model to investigate competitiveness of various carbon mitigation strategies at 
alternative  carbon  prices  across  63  regions  in  the  U.S.  They  find  that  at  low  carbon 
prices, soil carbon sequestration through a change in cropping practices is competitive 
while at high carbon prices, abatement is achieved mainly through use of biomass for 
power generation and conversion of land to forests. Another dynamic agricultural sector 
model used to analyze allocation of cropland in the U.S. is POLYSYS (Ugarte et al. 
2003). It is more regionally disaggregated than FASOM with 305 agricultural statistical 
districts as defined by the USDA. Walsh et al. (2003) apply POLYSYS to examine the 
potential for using CRP land to produce bioenergy crops at various bioenergy prices and 
find that switchgrass is more competitive than woody bioenergy crops. Using POLYSYS, 
English et al. (2008) show that the corn ethanol mandate will lead to major increases in 
corn production in the Corn Belt and shift in production regions for other crops over the 
period 2007-2016 (assuming that cellulosic biofuels are not feasible over this period). 
Malcolm  (2008)  uses  Regional  Environment  and  Agriculture  Programming  Model 
(REAP),  a  partial-equilibrium  model  of  the  U.S.  agricultural  sector  consisting  of  50 
regions,  to  quantify  the  extent  to  which  substitution  of  crop-residue  based  cellulosic 
ethanol for corn ethanol reduces soil erosion and nutrient deposition. Based on county-
level data, Khanna et al. (2008) examines the implications of meeting pre-determined 
biofuel targets on cropland use and the optimal mix of cellulosic feedstocks in Illinois, 
and find that biofuel targets lead to a significant shift in crop rotation and tillage practices 
and miscanthus has more cost advantage than switchgrass in Illinois. 
This  paper  differs  from  previous  studies  in  several  aspects.  We  extend  our 
previous dynamic land use model (Khanna et al. 2008) by incorporating the fuel market   8 
while  considering  alternative  sources  of  bioenergy  feedstcocks  such  as  corn,  stover, 
miscanthus  and  switchgrass.  We  specify  a  constant  elasticity  of  substitution  (CES) 
production for miles from which fuel demands are obtained. Current studies assume that 
ethanol and gasoline are either perfect substitutes (de Gorter and Just 2008; de Gorter and 
Just  2009)  or  complete  complements  (Vedenov  and  Wetzstein  2008).  Given  current 
vehicle technology and the existence of E85 and E10, we model gasoline and ethanol as 
imperfect substitutes with a flexible substitution since it is too constraining to impose 
perfect substitutability or complete complements. Under alternative policy scenarios, we 
compare the competitiveness of alternative bioenergy feedstocks and analyze the optimal 
mix while recognizing temporal and spatial heterogeneity in returns to land at a county 
level rather than much broader regions considered in previous land use studies. Due to 
the  perennial  nature  of  miscanthus  and  switchgrass,  we  use  a  multi-period  dynamic 
rolling  horizon  model.  The  model  generates  a  time  path  of  the  costs  under  different 
policy scenarios and examines its sensitivity to assumptions about the processing cost of 
cellulosic ethanol and the production costs of cellulosic feedstocks.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
  In  this  section,  we  examine  the  effects  of  a  carbon  tax  on  food  and  fuel 
consumption and land allocation. We consider an economy in which utility is produced 
from miles driven (m), food (f) and there is disutility from GHG emissions. Utility is 
additive  and  is  given  by  the  sub-utility  functions  U=U(m)+U(f),  where 
0 ( ) ( )
m
U m P m dm =∫ and 
0 ( ) ( )
f
U f P f df =∫ . The sub-utility functions are assumed to be 
strictly increasing and concave. P(m) and P(f) are the market demand functions of miles   9 
and food, and assumed to satisfy 
'( ) 0 P m < and 
'( ) 0 P f < . To avoid corner solutions, we 
assume lim ( ) 0 m P m →∞ = ,  0 lim ( ) m P m → = ∞ ,lim ( ) 0 f P f →∞ =  and  0 lim ( ) f P f → = ∞. 
Fuels  for  vehicles  consist  of  a  flexible  combination  of  gasoline  and  ethanol, 
denoted by g and e, respectively. A CES production function that relates m to g and e 
with  constant  returns  to  scale  is  assumed,
1/ ( , ) [ (1 ) ] m g e ag a e
ρ ρ ρ γ = + − ,  where 
' ( , ) 0 g m g e > , 
' ( , ) 0 e m g e > , 
'' ( , ) 0 gg m g e < , 
'' ( , ) 0 ee m g e < and 
'' ( , ) 0 ge m g e > .  This  function 
allows for flexibility in the degree of substitutability between gasoline and ethanol. The 
carbon emissions generated from a gallon of gasoline and ethanol are assumed to be δg 
and  δe,  respectively,  with  δg  >  δe.  To  keep  the  theoretical  model  tractable,  we  only 
consider a single type of biofuel, e, and assume food production is a clean technology and 
does not generate GHG emissions. We relax these assumptions in the empirical model. 
Aggregate GHG emissions are, therefore, equal to δgg + δee. The carbon tax is given by t.  
  For simplicity, we assume land is homogenous in quality and its endowment is 
denoted by L. Let the portion of land dedicated to the production of food and ethanol be 
Lf and Le, respectively. Without loss of generality, both the outputs of food and ethanol 
per unit of land can be normalized to one, so Lf = f and Le =e. The land used to produce 
food and ethanol should be less than the total land availability,  0 L f e − − ≥ . The costs of 
producing food and fuels are assumed to be strictly convex, denoted by c(i),  { , , } i g e f ∈ . 
The cost c(e) includes the conversion cost of food to ethanol. We assume marginal cost of 
ethanol is greater than that of gasoline, 
' ' ( ) ( ) c e c g > .    10 
The social planner determines the welfare-maximizing choice of fuel and food 
production while taking into account the externality cost of carbon emissions by solving 
the following problem:  
, , ( ( , )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) g e g e f MaxU m g e U f t g e c g c e c f δ δ + − + − − −     
subject to  
1/ [ (1 ) ] m r ag a e
ρ ρ ρ = + −  and  0 L f e − − ≥ .    
The Lagrangian is:  
( ( , )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) g e l U m g e U f t g e c g c e c f L f e δ δ λ = + − + − − − + − −   (1) 
and the first order conditions are: 
' ( )
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where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier and measures land rent. 
  Equation (2) implies that it is optimal to choose the gasoline consumption when 
marginal benefit obtained from gasoline is equal to its production cost plus its externality 
cost. Similarly, equation (3) shows marginal benefit from ethanol should be equal to its 
production  cost  plus  externality  cost  and  land  rent.  Equation  (4)  illustrates  that  the 
optimal food consumption occurs when the marginal benefit of food equals its production 
cost plus land rent. In a market economy, consumers will not consider externality costs in 
their  consumption  decisions.  To  induce  the  optimal  outcomes,  equation  (2)  and  (3) 
suggest environmental taxes should be levied on fuels based on their carbon intensity.   11 
  The  marginal  utility  from  fuels  is  obtained  from  their  contribution  to  the 
production of miles that generate utility. Equation (2)  (3)  and (4) together imply the 
relative consumption of gasoline and biofuels depends on their marginal costs and the net 
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The carbon tax increases the marginal costs of fuels and the ratio of the marginal 
cost  of  gasoline  to  ethanol  since  gasoline  is  more  carbon  intensive  than  ethanol. 
Therefore it is straightforward to derive d(g/e)/dt<0 (see Appendix 1) from (5). Further 
insight into the properties of the optimal solutions can be  gained from the following 
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where p(m) is the price of miles, which depends upon the marginal costs of fuels; εm, Emg, 
sg are demand elasticity of miles, output elasticity of miles with respect to gasoline, and 
gasoline supply elasticity, respectively. We define mg and me as the marginal productivity 
of fuels in producing miles (which can be interpreted as fuel efficiency) with me> mg due   12 
to the assumption of 
' ' ( ) ( ) c e c g > (See Appendix 2). Moreover, from the property of the 
CES production function of miles, we know an increase in gasoline consumption leads to 
a  decrease  in  mg and  an  increase  in  me.  We  define
g e e g m m δ δ ε − as  the  elasticity  of  the 
difference in fuel efficiency due to the change in gasoline consumption. 
  From  (6a),  we  show  that  imposing  a  carbon  tax  always  reduces  the  gasoline 
consumption. Equation (6b) illustrates that the change in ethanol with the carbon tax 
depends upon the magnitudes of a variety of parameters, such as carbon intensity of fuels, 
the  demand  elasticity  of  miles,  the  supply  elasticity  of  gasoline  and  the  elasticity  of 
substitution between gasoline and ethanol. Equation (6c) shows that due to the limited 
land endowment the land allocated to food decreases while the land rent increases with an 
increase in ethanol, respectively. From (6d), we find that gasoline consumption decreases 
with  increased  land  availability  when  miles  demand  is  inelastic  and  the  substitution 
between  fuels  is  high.  Finally,  (6e)  demonstrates  that  increasing  the  land  availability 
raises land allocated to both ethanol and food production and decreases land rent. 
We now examine the impacts of alternative parameters on the optimal choices 
graphically. Given a demand curve for miles Dm in Figure (1a) and marginal cost curves 




0 are determined by maximizing utility (in the absence of the carbon tax). 
This also results in demand curves for gasoline Dg and ethanol De, and a marginal cost 
curve for miles, MCm. Internalization of the emission cost shifts the marginal cost curves 




e with the former likely to shift further to the left than 
the  latter  since  gasoline  is  more  carbon  intensive  than  ethanol.  Subsequently,  the 
marginal cost of miles shifts to the left to MC
t
m, and miles driven decreases to M* <M
0. If   13 
miles  demand  is  considerably  inelastic  (εm  ≈  0)  and  gasoline  price  is  fixed  (sg=∞), 
gasoline price increases by its marginal externality cost tδg in Figure (1b), which in turn 
leads to an increase in the miles price. However since miles demand is inelastic, the 
carbon tax only results in a slight reduction in VMT as shown in Figure (1a). Substitution 
effect of ethanol to gasoline is expected to be greater than the miles effect as shown in 
Figure (1e). The change in VMT in turn generates a subsequent effect on fuel demand 
curves, which shifts the demand curve for gasoline to the left to D
t
g, and the demand 
curve for ethanol to the right to D
t
e. Optimal fuels consumption are, therefore, g*< g
0 and 
e*> e
0 and optimal miles driven is M* <M
0. As the demand for ethanol increases, land 
rent increases from λ
0 to λ
* as shown in Figure (1d).  
Now we consider another case in which gasoline supply is inelastic and miles 
demand is elastic (εm ≈ -∞). In this case, VMT significantly decrease due to its increased 
marginal cost and elastic demand curve. Gasoline consumption does not decline much 
because of its inelastic supply curve. In this case the miles effect is likely to be greater 
than the substitution effect of ethanol to gasoline as shown in Figure (2e). Accordingly, 
demand curves for fuels shift to the left in Figure (2b) and (2c). Optimal consumption of 
fuels is less than the levels under no-intervention while less competition for land lowers 
the food price and land rent as shown in Figure (2d). However, under both cases, total 
GHG  emissions  decline  since  gasoline  and  ethanol  are  functions  of  carbon  tax;  thus  
dGHG/dt < 0 (see Appendix 3).  
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Non-Optimal Biofuel Policies 
We now consider the case where a carbon tax is not implemented and instead 
alternative  biofuel  policies  are  developed  and  examine  their  effects  on food  and  fuel 
markets.  
Blend Mandate 
A blend mandate requires a minimum share of biofuel β in mixed fuel sold, where 
0<β<1. Under this policy, there is no carbon tax on fuels. We refer to the case where the 
carbon  tax  t=0,  and  the  ratio  of  ethanol  to  total  fuel  is  e/(e+g)=β.  Such  a  policy 
encourages production and consumption of biofuel because it increases the biofuel share 
in  fuel  consumption  relative  to  the  level  with  non-intervention.  The  consumption  of 
ethanol and gasoline is likely to be higher and lower, respectively, than that with non-
intervention. Imposing the blend mandate shifts ethanol demand curve to the right to D
B
e 
and gasoline demand curve to the left to D
B
g as shown in Figure (3c) and (3b). In Figure 
(3a), an increase in the blend mandate of β is likely to result in a higher marginal cost of 
miles and will shift the marginal cost curve of miles to the left to MC
B
m. The decreased 
VMT  in  turn  adjusts  the  fuel  consumption  to  comply  with  the  mandate  as  shown  in 
Figure (3e). However, as shown in Appendix 4 the fuel consumption depends upon the 
elasticity of miles demand curve. Intuitively, if miles demand is inelastic, the miles effect 
is  expected  to  have  a  small  impact  on  fuel  consumption  and  the  substitution  effect 






0. Accordingly, land 
rent increases as shown in Figure (3d). But if the miles demand is elastic, the opposite 
results would be obtained.    15 
de Gorter and Just (2009) argued that an increase in β is possible to lower the 
consumer  price  of  miles  if  the  gasoline  supply  is  elastic  relative  to  ethanol.  That  is 
because the gasoline price would drop significantly as the demand for gasoline decreases, 
which is possible to offset the increase in ethanol price to lower the marginal cost of 
miles. Therefore, an elastic gasoline supply curve further increases the consumption of 
miles, which in turn increases the demand for ethanol.  
Blend Mandate and a Subsidy on Ethanol 
  Current US biofuel policy gives a $0.45 per gallon for corn ethanol and 2008 farm 
bill proposes a $1.01 per gallon for cellulosic ethanol to promote ethanol production. We 
now analyze impacts of ethanol subsidy when the blend mandate is in place. The subsidy 
encourages more ethanol consumption and VMT because it lowers the marginal cost of 
ethanol, which in turn decreases the marginal cost of miles. Graphically, this subsidy 
shifts the supply curve of ethanol from MCe to the right to MC
s
e in Figure (3c). It is also 
likely to shift marginal cost curve of miles from MC
B
m to the right to MC
s
m in Figure (3a), 
the extent to which depends upon the level of subsidy. Reduced cost leads to an increase 
inVMT, which is expected to raise the consumption of both fuels since the blend mandate 
does not allow substitutability between them. Gasoline demand increases and its demand 
curve shifts from D
B
g to the right to D
E
g as shown in Figure (3b). This ethanol subsidy is 
likely to lead to a reduction in food consumption and an increase in land rent as shown in 
Figure (3c).  
  Hence, when a binding blend mandate is in place the ethanol subsidy leads to 
increases in the consumption of fuels, VMT and carbon emissions and a decrease in the 
social welfare. Appendix 4 shows the impacts of this ethanol subsidy in the presence of   16 
the  blend  mandate:  0
dg
ds










>  and  0
dGHG
ds
> .  Further,  we 






















> .  
 
Empirical Model 
We  take  the  dynamic  spatial  optimization  model  developed  in  Khanna  et  al. 
(2008) as our starting point to analyze optimal land use strategies, fuel consumption, and 
production and consumption of various row crops and perennial crops under different 
policy scenarios while  maximizing the sum of discounted consumers’ and producers’ 
welfare in fuel and food markets in Illinois over the 16-year planning horizon of 2007-
2022.
2 This  paper  extends  the  previous  model  by  taking  into  account  fuel  market  by 
assuming consumers obtain utility from VMT that are produced by blending gasoline, 
corn ethanol and cellulosic ethanol. Gasoline and ethanol are imperfect substitutes in the 
production  of  VMT  while  corn  ethanol  and  cellulosic  ethanol  are  perfect  substitutes. 
Miles consumers’ behavior is represented by a constant elasticity demand curve while we 
assume a CES production function for VMT.  
The  key  assumptions  for  this  paper  are  summarized  as  follows.  The  model 
considers the returns from the sales of co-products of corn ethanol production, DDGs, 
which are assumed to be a perfect substitute for feed corn based on their conversion rate. 
Since Illinois is a relatively small consumer of gasoline, we use a fixed gasoline price 
                                                 
2 See Khanna et al (2008) for rigorous model description. 
   17 
during the planning horizon. Corn yield is assumed to increase 1.8 bushel per year while 
the yields of other crops remains constant over time. The blending mandates over time in 
Illinois are assumed to be the same as the national level while the blending mandates 
beyond 2022 are being set at their levels in 2022.  
Data and Parameters 
  We  apply  this  model  in  Illinois  using  county-specific  data  to  examine  the 
economic  and  environmental  implications  of  alternative  ethanol  policies.  We  assume 
constant elasticity demand curves for miles and food and feed with an elasticity of -0.4 
for  VMT  demand  (Parry  and  Small  2005;  Vedenov  and  Wetzstein  2008).
3  To 
parameterize the demand of food and miles for future years, we assume demand for corn, 
soybeans and miles increase by 0.86%, 0.96% and 2.5% each year after 2007.
 4  
  We assume the elasticity of substitution in the CES production function increases 
gradually from 2 in 2007 to 10 in 2022 to capture the potentially increased substitutability 
between ethanol and gasoline. The related parameters for this CES production function 
are calibrated using 2007 market data. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 
reports that total vehicle-miles traveled in 2007 were 107.5 billion in Illinois while the 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that 4.7 billion gallons of gasoline and 
0.44 billion gallons of ethanol were consumed in Illinois for transportation use in 2007. 
Since Illinois is a relatively small consumer of gasoline, we fix the gasoline price as 
$2.38 per gallon in 2007 price in this model.
 5 We calibrate the market price of ethanol as 
the  wholesale  rack  price  for  corn  ethanol  plus  fuel  tax  and  per  gallon  net  return  in 
                                                 
3 See Khanna et al (2008) for deriving regional food demand curves. 
4 FAPRI (2008) and www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/vmt_grwt.htm$4foot; 
   http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/vmt_grwt.htm#4foot 
5 gas price: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_allmg_c_SIL_EPM0_cpgal_a.htm   18 
refinery and a $0.13 per gallon markup yielding $2.52 per gallon for corn ethanol in 2007. 
Similarly, we compute the consumer price of ethanol by using farm-gate production cost 
of ethanol per gallon plus the net return in refinery and the markup for the planning 
horizon.  Here,  the  net  return  for  ethanol  refinery  is  assumed  to  be  7%  of  equity 
investment, which is $0.07 and $0.29 per gallon for corn ethanol and cellulosic ethanol, 
respectively.  
We consider corn, soybeans, wheat and sorghum as the annual crops while alfalfa, 
switchgrass and miscanthus are considered as the perennial crops. Cellulosic ethanol can 
be produced from switchgrass, miscanthus and corn stover. We estimate county- specific 
rotation and tillage production costs in 2007 prices for four row crops—corn, soybeans, 
wheat and sorghum—and three perennial grasses—alfalfa, switchgrass and miscanthus. 
Corn stover yield and production costs are also estimated by alternative rotations and 
tillages (Sheehan et al. 2003). We conduct a life cycle analysis of the above ground CO2 
equivalent  emissions  (CO2e)  generated  from  biofuels  production  using  different 
feedstocks; the major GHG emissions are converted to equivalent levels based on their 
100-year global warming potential (IPCC 2001). We include the CO2e generated not only 
from various inputs and machinery used on the farm in the production of each feedstock 
and the energy used to produce and transport those inputs to the farm, but also from the 
energy used to transport the feedstock to a biorefinery and the energy used to convert the 
feedstock  to  biofuel.  Detailed  description  about  crop  production  costs  and  carbon 
emissions  associated  with  crop  production  and  ethanol  conversion  can  be  found  in 
Khanna et al. (2008).   19 
As a major exporter of ethanol, we assume Illinois exports 50% of its ethanol 
production  under  all  scenarios  except  the  scenarios  under  the  blend  mandates.  This 
percentage is derived based on observed ethanol consumption and production in Illinois 
in 2007. We follow the method proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
to estimate the blend mandates in Illinois for the 16 years.
6 Specifically, we first compute 
total fuel consumption using projected national miles consumption that is estimated using 
the miles consumption in 2007 multiplied by 2.5% per year. Then we calculate the energy 
equivalent value needed for the projected national miles consumption while assuming a 
constant fuel efficiency of 17.2 miles per gallon.
 7 Based on energy equivalent value of 
ethanol to gasoline that is 1 gallon of ethanol is equivalent to 2/3 gallon of gasoline and 
RFS’  ethanol  consumption  mandates,
 we  obtain  separate  blending  mandates  for  corn 
ethanol and cellulosic ethanol in total fuel consumption for the planning horizon of 2007-
2022. Since the CES function degenerates to a linear function of fuels under the blend 
mandates, the above approach of deriving the blend mandates, therefore, is consistent 
with  our  model  setup.  In  addition,  under  the  blending  mandates  we  assume  Illinois 
produces 18.8% of the RFS corn ethanol mandate, and exports 9% of the RFS cellulosic 
ethanol mandate.  
Finally,  as  proposed  by  the  recent  Farm  Bill  (2008),  the  tax  credits  for  corn 
ethanol and cellulosic ethanol are $0.45 and $1.01 per gallon while eligible cellulosic 
biomass is subsidized by  $45 per ton for the first two  years after  establishment. We 
account for a fuel tax of $0.387 per gallon on fuels. 
 
                                                 
6 Revised Renewable Fuel Standard for 2008, Issued Pursuant to Section 211(o) of the Clean Air Act as 
Amended by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. 
7 http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs06/htm/vm1.htm   20 
Results 
  We  simulate the  fuel  and  food  consumption  and  land  use  decision  under  five 
different  scenarios:  no  intervention  (baseline),  carbon  tax,  status-quo  tax  credits  and 
blend mandates without and with subsidies. The fuel tax of $0.387 per gallon is imposed 
on both gasoline and ethanol in all scenarios. We report land use decision, commodity 
consumer and producer prices and quantities, environmental and social welfare effects for 
the various scenarios. Social welfare is the sum of discounted producers’ and consumers’ 
surplus  over  16  years’  planning  horizon  while  the  environmental  effects  are  also 
accumulative  over  the  same  period.  In  the  welfare  section,  we  compute  the  welfare 
change for each scenario relative to the baseline, and decompose it into the changes from 
miles  consumption,  crop  production  and  consumption,  government  revenue  and 
environmental externality. 
No Intervention (Baseline) 
  We simulate the baseline scenario where there is no biofuel or carbon policy. In 
this scenario, gasoline consumption is about 7 B gallons in 2022 and VMT is 147 B miles. 
Of  the  total  fuel  consumption,  ethanol  accounts  for  0.4  B  gallons  while  the  ratio  of 
ethanol in total fuel consumption is only 0.6%. Only 1% of corn production is used for 
ethanol production while corn price is $4.1 per bushel and land rent is $342 per acre. 
Total GHG emissions are 0.77 M tons in this scenario and gasoline contributes 91% since 
it has a large share in total fuel consumption. Nitrogen use is 15.1 thousand tons. 
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Carbon Tax 
  Next  we  examine  the  effects  of  a  carbon  tax  of  $34  per  ton,  a  carbon  price 
expected to prevail in the near future
8. As compared to the baseline, VMT decreases by 
5% (from 147 B miles to 141 B miles) due to the carbon tax while raising social welfare 
by $0.7 B. In this scenario, only corn ethanol is produced since cellulosic ethanol is still 
more costly than corn ethanol while gasoline consumption decreases by 8% relative to 
the  baseline.  Increased  ethanol  production  raises  the  ratio  of  ethanol  to  total  fuel 
consumption  in  2022  to  4.7%.  Due  to  increased  ethanol  production  and  cropland 
competition, corn price and land rent are 3% and 2% higher than that in the baseline, 
respectively. GHG emissions reduce by 3% while nitrogen use increases by 0.3% relative 
to the baseline.  
Status-quo 
  In this scenario, we assume that existing biofuel policies prevail and that there is a 
subsidy of $0.45 per gallon and $1.01 per gallon for corn ethanol and cellulosic ethanol, 
respectively.  This  policy  intends  to  encourage  cellulosic  ethanol  production  as  a 
substitute for corn ethanol and gasoline to reduce GHG emissions. It leads to a large 
increase in ethanol consumption of 0.7 B gallons in 2022 relative to the baseline. As 
compared to the baseline, gasoline consumption declines by 8% while VMT remain the 
same due to an inelastic miles demand. The ratio of ethanol to total fuel consumption 
increases  to  10%.  Of  the  total  corn  production  in  2022,  23%  is  used  for  ethanol 
production, which in turn reduces the quantity of corn for food and feed consumption and 
leads to an increase in corn price by 7% and land rent by 6%, respectively, relative to the 
baseline levels. The policy of status-quo reduces GHG emissions by 1% but increases 
                                                 
8 http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-change/european-co2-emissions-2007/article-171327   22 
nitrogen  use  by  2%  as  compared  to  the  baseline.  Due  to  government  spending  and 
consumer welfare losses, social welfare is $0.8 B less than the baseline. 
Land Use Implications for Non-Mandate Scenarios 
Under all scenarios aside from blend mandates, we find there are insignificant 
effects on land use outcomes due to a relatively small quantity of ethanol production. Of 
the total cropland, the acreages allocated to corn and soybeans change from 49% and 
44%  under  the  baseline  to  50%  and  43%  under  the  status-quo,  while  the  share  of 
conservation  tillage  varies  from  37%  under  the  carbon  tax  policy  to  42%  under  the 
baseline. The land under corn-soybean rotation and corn-corn rotation ranges from 70% 
and 14% under the carbon tax policy to 80% and 9% under the baseline. However, under 
these scenarios, no cropland is allocated to corn stover and dedicated energy crops due to 
their high production costs. 
Blend Mandates 
The effect of the blend mandates without subsidy on ethanol and bioenergy crops 
is simulated in this scenario. The ratio of ethanol to total fuel consumption increases to 
14%  due  to  the  blending  mandates.  This  policy  also  leads  to  an  increase  in  ethanol 
consumption at 0.41 B gallons and 0.58 B gallons of cellulosic ethanol. It has the lowest 
demand for gasoline at 6.15 B gallons with a reduction by 12% relative to the baseline.  
The diversion of land to biofuel production affects the prices of both corn and 
soybeans because of the reduced acreage and consumption of these commodities for food 
and feed uses, as shown in Figure 4. In particular, the blend mandates require 45% of the 
total corn production used for ethanol, which increases corn price by 14% (from $4.1 per 
bushel to $4.7 per bushel) relative to the baseline. Soybeans production decreases by 16%   23 
(from 0.44 B bushels to 0.37 B bushels) and price increases by 2% (from $10.9 per 
bushel to $11.1 per bushel). Compared to the baseline, land rent increases by 11% (from 
$342 per acre to $379 per acre). 
Since ethanol has a small share in the total fuel consumption, the increase in 
ethanol  use  cannot  offset  the  reduction  in  GHG  emissions  due  to  decreased  use  of 
gasoline. GHG emissions decrease slightly by less than 1% while increasing nitrogen use 
by  13%  relative  to  the  baseline.  Social  welfare  decreases  by  $2.3  B  relative  to  the 
baseline due to forgone income from taxes, externality cost and deadweight losses caused 
by sub-optimal options.  
  Imposing  blend  mandates  has  three  types  of  effects  on  land  use.  First  and 
foremost, it leads to a conversion of land from food crops to biofuel crops. The results 
show an increase in the percentage of land under corn (from 49% to 54%) and a decrease 
in the percentage of land under soybeans (from 44% to 38%), wheat (from 3% to 2.9%) 
and pasture (from 2.2% to 1.7%) relative to the baseline. Of the total cropland, 4.5% will 
be allocated to miscanthus production while switchgrass will not be produced due to its 
low yield and cost disadvantage compared to miscanthus. All available corn stover will 
be collected for cellulosic ethanol production in 2022.  The trends in acreages under corn, 
soybeans, corn stover and miscanthus are shown in Figure 5. We find corn stover and 
miscanthus  will  be  used  conjunctively  to  produce  biofuels.  Specifically,  33%  of 
cellulosic ethanol in 2022 will be produced from miscanthus.  
  Second, we observe a dramatic change in rotation and tillage practices under the 
blend  mandates.  In  particular,  the  percentage  of  cropland  under  conservation  tillage 
increases from 42% to 57% for the ease of collecting corn stover relative to the baseline.   24 
The cropland under corn-soybean rotation decreases from 80% to 47% relative to the 
baseline while the cropland under corn-corn rotation increases from 9% to 31%.  
  Third,  we  also  find  a  considerably  spatial  variability  in  the  land  converted  to 
cellulosic feedstocks across counties and over time under this scenario. In 2015, 82% of 
corn  acreage  will  be  in  the  central  and  northern  Illinois  while  corn  stover  will  be 
collected in 40 of 102 counties in those regions. In contrast, all available corn stover will 
be collected including counties in southern Illinois for cellulosic ethanol production in 
2022  as  shown  in  Figure  6.  Miscanthus  production  will  occur  until  2016  when  all 
available corn stover cannot meet the blend mandate with 15 counties allocating about 
8.5 thousand acres. Towards the end of the planning horizon 41 of the 102 countries will 
allocate  5%  of  their  total  cropland  to  miscanthus  production,  which  is  primarily 
concentrated in the southern counties. 
Blend Mandates with Subsidies 
We simulate the effects of blend mandates with corn ethanol subsidy of $0.45 per 
gallon, cellulosic ethanol subsidy of $1.01 per gallon and $45 per metric ton on biomass 
in this scenario. This policy shows insignificant impacts on land use and commodity 
production and prices relative to the scenario under the blend mandates without subsidies. 
However, due to the subsidies for ethanol production, the consumer price of corn and 
cellulosic ethanol decline by 18% (from $2.4 per gallon to $2 per gallon) and 37% (from 
$3 per gallon to $1.9 per gallon), respectively, as compared to the mandates scenario 
without subsidies. That in turn increases VMT by 1% (2 B miles) while raising gasoline 
consumption  by  1%  relative  to  the  mandates  without  subsidies.  Accordingly,  GHG 
emissions increase by 1%. Since it induces a significant amount of government expense   25 
and externality cost, this policy is the most welfare-reducing policy with $3.3 B losses 
relative to the baseline.  
The  welfare  estimates  in  this  paper  provide  an  idea  of  how  large  the 
environmental and energy security benefits should be to justify the ethanol subsidy and 
mandates. In the planning horizon of 16 years, the cumulative additional production of 
ethanol  is  about  6.4  billon  gallons  relative  to  the  baseline.  Therefore,  if  the  ethanol 
policies are to create a net social welfare gain, external benefits of each gallon of ethanol 
should be valued at least at $0.51 per gallon of ethanol.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
We  examine  the  sensitivity  of  our  results  to  the  processing  cost  of  cellulosic 
ethanol, low production costs of dedicated bioenergy grasses with high yields (low cost) 
and high production costs of dedicated bioenergy grasses with low yields (high cost). 
Table 2 shows the results under the mandate scenario relative to the baseline. We find 
that reducing the processing cost of cellulosic ethanol gradually from $1.76 per gallon in 
2007 to $0.7 per gallon in 2022 decreases the consumer price of cellulosic ethanol by 
60%  (from  $1.89  per  gallon  to  $0.77  per  gallon)  as  compared  to  the  mandates  with 
subsidies. As a result, it lowers the consumer price of miles, which leads to an increase in 
VMT by 1% (about 2 B miles) relative to the mandates with subsidies.  
The changes in the production costs and harvesting yields of dedicated energy 
crops have a small impact on land allocation. In the low cost scenario, the percentage of 
land under miscanthus increases by 0.5% relative to the mandates and stover is collected 
on 96% of available corn acres. That is because miscanthus becomes more competitive 
than  stover  in  producing  cellulosic  ethanol  under  this  assumption.  In  the  high  cost   26 
scenario, we find that the land under miscanthus instead increases by 1.6% (from 4.7% to 
6.3%) while all available stover is collected for cellulosic ethanol production, although 
miscanthus becomes less competitive. This is because the binding mandates will require 
more land allocated to miscanthus given its low yield and limited availability of corn 
stover.  
Concluding Remarks 
  Energy security and environmental concerns stimulate the current biofuel policies. 
This  article  develops  a  dynamic  spatial  optimization  land  use  model  to  analyze  the 
implications of prevailing biofuel policies on land allocation among food and fuel crops, 
social welfare and the environment. Although this study has a narrow geographical focus, 
our main conclusions are similar to those obtained by stylized models using a similar 
framework and applied to the U.S. as a whole (Ando, Khanna and Taheripour 2009; 
Khanna,  Ando  and  Taheripour  2008).  We  find  existing  ethanol  tax  credits  result  in 
substantial deadweight losses and an increase in GHG emissions relative to the baseline. 
The ethanol mandates with subsidies would lead to further welfare losses and an increase 
in GHG emissions. 
  Our results support the use of a carbon tax to correct the externality caused by 
fuel consumption, but not an ethanol subsidy. A subsidy increases the use of ethanol 
which emits less GHG than gasoline, but the benefits of reduced GHG emissions are not 
enough to offset the deadweight losses of the subsidy. We find that the blend mandates 
with subsidies lead to an increase in VMT and gasoline, which in turn increases GHG 
emissions relative to the baseline. The demand for corn ethanol also results in 54% of 
land allocated to corn production, which is a nitrogen-intensive technology. Accordingly,   27 
water quality  would become worse. Since the blend mandates with subsidies induces 
significant  government payments and externality  cost, it is the most welfare-reducing 
policy.  It  also  results  in  a  significant  shift  in  the  acreage  from  soybeans,  wheat  and 
pasture to corn, and a change in crop rotation and tillage practices as compared to the 
baseline. Despite an increase in corn production by 6%, the blending mandates would 
lead to considerable increases in corn and soybeans prices. Among cellulosic feedstocks, 
corn stover is likely to be used for cellulosic ethanol production in initial years. However 
all available corn stover is insufficient to meet the targets. This makes miscanthus as an 
inevitable  alternative  source  of  bioenergy  while  switchgrass  is  not  competitive  as 
compared to miscanthus due to its relatively low yields in the study region. There is a 
considerably spatial variability in the allocation of land to food and fuel crops across 
Illinois. Corn and stover production would occur in central and northern Illinois while 
miscanthus production is primarily concentrated in the southern counties. 
  Sensitivity analysis presented here shows that the effects of biofuel mandates on 
land allocation, GHG emissions and social welfare are not sensitive to the technology 
improvement  in  refineries  plants  and  assumed  variation  in  the  production  costs  and 
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Table 1. Results of Ethanol Policies on Land Use, Crop Production, the Environment and Welfare in 2022 
 
Baseline













Corn ethanol subsidy ($/gallon)  0.00  0.00  0.45  0.00  0.45 
Cellulosic ethanol ($/gallon)  0.00  0.00  1.01  0.00  1.01 
Carbon tax ($/ton)  0.00  34.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Biomass subsidy ($/ton)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  45.00 
Land Use 
Total land (M Acres)  22.40  22.41  22.43  22.46  22.46 
Corn (%)  49.03  49.35  50.43  54.47  53.96 
Soybeans (%)  44.13  43.97  43.12  37.70  38.11 
Wheat(%)  3.00  3.01  3.06  2.88  2.81 
Pasture(%)  2.17  2.07  2.00  1.67  1.68 
Stover (%)  0.00  0.00  0.00  54.47  53.96 
Miscanthus (%)  0.00  0.00  0.00  4.53  4.66 
Conservation tillage(%)  42.18  37.22  40.91  57.01  56.32 
Corn-soybean rotation (%)  80.24  70.26  77.48  46.61  48.85 
Corn-corn rotation (%)  8.91  14.22  11.68  31.17  29.53 
Consumer Prices 
Miles ($/mile)  0.113  0.125  0.112  0.119  0.112 
Corn ethanol ($/gallon)  2.29  2.51  1.90  2.43  1.99 
Cellulosic ethanol ($/gallon)        3.03  1.89 
Corn ($/bushel)  4.11  4.22  4.39  4.68  4.74 
Soybean ($/bushel)  10.85  10.85  10.89  11.12  11.12 
Land rent ($/acre)  342.24  347.56  363.41  379.00  378.35 
Quantities (B Bushels/ Miles/Gallons) 
Corn Production  2.07  2.08  2.11  2.26  2.24 
Corn Consumption (non-ethanol use)  2.04  1.85  1.62  1.25  1.23 
Soybeans  0.44  0.44  0.43  0.37  0.37 
Miles  147.574  141.448  147.574  147.574  149.616 
Gasoline Consumed   6.96  6.42  6.37  6.15  6.24 
Corn Ethanol Consumed   0.04  0.31  0.71  0.41  0.42 
Cellulosic Ethanol Consumed  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.58  0.59 
Corn Ethanol Produced   0.09  0.63  1.38  2.82  2.82 
Stover Ethanol Produced  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.79  1.78 
Miscanthus Ethanol Produced   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.85  0.87 
Ethanol/fuel (%)  0.60  4.49  10.07  13.94  13.94 
Environmental  and Welfare Effects 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (M tons)  0.771  0.734  0.761  0.775  0.783 
Nitrogen (1000 tons)  15.101  15.146  15.417  16.990  16.955 
Change in Total Welfare ($B)  0.00  0.65  -0.82  -2.34  -3.27 
Change in Miles Consumers’ Surplus ($B)  0.00  -25.54  2.35  -5.14  0.99 
Change in Crop Consumers’ Surplus ($B)  0.00  -1.38  -5.25  -15.09  -15.18 
Change in Crop Producers’ Surplus ($B)  0.00  1.42  5.86  18.02  18.14 
Change in Government Revenue ($B)  0.00  24.89  -4.11  0.00  -6.84 
Change in Externality Cost ($B)  0.00  1.26  0.34  -0.12  -0.39 
a There is no biofuel policy or carbon tax.  
b $0.45 per gallon and $1.01 per gallon subsidies on corn ethanol and cellulosic ethanol, respectively.  
c Besides  the subsidies on ethanol there is a subsidy of $45 per ton on biomass.   31 
    Table 2. Results Under Blending Mandates with Cost and Yield Changes 
  Reduced 
Processing Cost of 
Cellulosic Ethanol 
Low Cost  High Cost 
Land Use 
Total land (M Acres)  22.46  22.46  22.46 
Corn (%)  53.96  53.51  54.14 
Soybeans (%)  38.08  38.43  37.08 
Wheat(%)  2.80  2.70  2.72 
Pasture(%)  1.68  1.65  1.66 
Stover (%)  53.96  51.44  54.14 
Miscanthus (%)  4.70  5.16  6.25 
Conservation tillage(%)  56.33  55.38  55.94 
Corn-soybean rotation (%)  52.61  52.97  46.11 
Corn-corn rotation (%)  27.65  27.02  31.09 
Consumer Prices 
Miles ($/mile)  0.109  0.113  0.114 
Corn ethanol ($/gallon)  1.99  1.99  1.99 
Cellulosic ethanol ($/gallon)  0.77  1.75  2.02 
Corn ($/bushel)  4.74  4.74  4.74 
Soybean ($/bushel)  11.12  11.12  11.16 
Land rent ($/acre)  378.73  350.91  393.17 
Quantities (B Bushels/ Miles/Gallons) 
Corn Production  2.24  2.22  2.24 
Corn Consumption (non-ethanol use)  1.23  1.22  1.24 
Soybeans  0.37  0.38  0.36 
Miles  151.659  149.616  149.616 
Gasoline Consumed  6.32  6.24  6.24 
Corn Ethanol Consumed  0.43  0.42  0.42 
Cellulosic Ethanol Consumed  0.60  0.59  0.59 
Corn Ethanol Produced  2.82  2.82  2.82 
Stover Ethanol Produced  1.78  1.72  1.78 
Miscanthus Ethanol Produced  0.87  0.93  0.86 
Ethanol/fuel (%)  13.94  13.94  13.94 
Environmental  and Welfare Effects 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (M tons)  0.788  0.788  0.783 
Nitrogen (1000 tons)  16.956  16.796  16.984 
Change in Total Welfare ($B)  -0.96  -4.17  -3.82 
Change in Miles Consumers’ Surplus ($B)  3.52  1.13  0.90 
Change in Crop Consumers’ Surplus ($B)  -15.18  -15.15  -15.24 
Change in Crop Producers’ Surplus ($B)  18.14  17.55  17.82 
Change in Government Revenue ($B)  -6.89  -7.12  -6.90 
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Since δg > δe, then we have  
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Appendix 2: Comparative Static Analysis of a Carbon Tax on Consumption of Fuels 
and Carbon Emissions 
By total differentiating  (1) to (3), we  can examine the comparative static changes of 
optimal  solutions  resulting  from  changes  in  carbon  tax  and  land  availability.  Total 
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The first term of H is positive according to our assumptions that utility functions 
are strictly concave and cost functions are convex. After substituting mg me mge mgg mee 
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Therefore, the determinant of H is always positive. 
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Demand for fuels can be derived through the following problem:  
, min e g e g p e p g +  s.t. 
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,  respectively. 
Since e is more costly to be produced than g according to our assumption, 
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Where p(m) is the price of miles, which depends upon the marginal costs of fuels; εm, Emg, 
sg are the demand elasticity of miles, output elasticity of miles with respect to gasoline 
and gasoline supply elasticity, respectively. Here, we define mg and me as fuel efficiency 
to  measure  the  marginal  contribution  of  fuels  in  producing  miles.  For  instance,  an 
increase in g leads to a decrease in mg and an increase in me. 
g e e g m m δ δ ε − measures the 
elasticity in the difference of fuel efficiency due to the change in g.  
It is straightforward to show
df de
dt dt
= − ,           (A2.3) 
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Appendix 3: Proof of the Change of Total GHG Emissions 
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Appendix 4: Comparative Static Analysis of a Blend Mandate and a Biofuel Tax 
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The maximization problem (P) reduces to  
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The ratio of ethanol to gasoline is e/g=β/(1-β). For the ease of exposition, if let ω=1/β-1, 
then  g=ωe.  Then  the  production  function  of  miles  reduces  to 
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The first order conditions for (P1) are:  
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Further, we examine the second derivatives of variables with respect to the blend 
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Figure 3: Impacts of Ethanol Mandates and Subsidies when Miles Demand is Inelastic 
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Figure 6: Spatial Distribution in Land Use with Biofuel Blending Mandates 
 